What Russia’s Election Means for Ukraine—and the Cost of Continuing the War

By Ben Lavine

October 10, 2026 6:19 PM CDT

At first glance, Russia’s September State Duma election looked like a major victory for the Kremlin. United Russia secured 349 of the chamber’s 450 seats, according to final results reported by the Associated Press, while meaningful anti-war opposition was largely excluded from the race. But for Ukraine, the more important story may be what happened immediately after the polls closed.

Within days, the Russian government began setting out the cost of continuing the war. On September 28, Vladimir Putin signed a decree increasing the authorized strength of Russia’s armed forces to 1,550,500 servicemen, up from 1,535,000.  The following day, Reuters reported that Moscow planned to spend 17.1 trillion rubles on defense in 2027, about 27% above the amount originally budgeted and the highest level since the full-scale invasion began.

Taken together, these moves indicate that the Kremlin is preparing to sustain a larger and more expensive military effort. They also expose the growing difficulty of doing so without placing additional pressure on Russian society.

Manpower is one of the clearest problems.

Before the election, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Russia was preparing to draft another 300,000 troops after the vote. The Kremlin denied the claim, and Putin dismissed reports of a new mobilization as “utter nonsense.” There is currently no evidence that Moscow has ordered another mass mobilization comparable to the call-up of 300,000 reservists in 2022.

But there are signs that finding soldiers is becoming more difficult. Independent Russian outlet Mediazona reports that cases in which Russians are pressured, threatened or deceived into signing military contracts have become increasingly common as the number of willing recruits falls relative to the expanding needs of the front. Mediazona documented cases including people allegedly being coerced into signing contracts and then sent to the front.

That helps explain why another mobilization remains politically sensitive for the Kremlin. The 2022 call-up produced protests and prompted large numbers of military-age Russians to leave the country. Since then, Moscow has relied heavily on contract recruitment, financial incentives and other measures to replenish its forces rather than announcing another nationwide mobilization.

For Ukraine, this is an important constraint. Russia can still field a very large military, but replacing losses requires increasing financial and political resources. Putin’s decision to raise the official military headcount does not prove that another mass draft is coming. What it does show is that the Kremlin has authorized a larger military establishment.

The economic figures tell the same story.

According to Reuters, Russia’s proposed 2027 budget would cut planned spending on social policy by 7%, education by 6% and healthcare by 6.8%, while defense spending rises sharply. Moscow is also planning additional borrowing and tax increases. Those figures matter because the Kremlin has spent much of the war trying to shield ordinary Russians from its economic consequences.

For several years, Moscow has been able to expand military production while maintaining an appearance of relative economic normality in much of the country. That balance is becoming more difficult. Reuters reports that economic growth has slowed, while the government is considering a series of tax increases between 2027 and 2029 to help finance rising military expenditures.

The proposed measures include additional taxes affecting businesses and individuals, while Russia is also relying more heavily on borrowing. Reuters reported that the projected 2027 budget deficit had risen to 2.2% of GDP, compared with an earlier forecast of 1.2%. 

The election itself should also be viewed carefully.

United Russia’s enormous majority gives Putin a parliament capable of approving military budgets and wartime legislation with little parliamentary resistance. But the result does not, by itself, establish the level of Russian public support for the war.

The election was tightly managed, the Yabloko party—the only registered party openly opposing the invasion—was barred from participating in the federal party-list contest, and international election monitoring was significantly restricted.

The result therefore provides stronger evidence of the Kremlin’s political control than it does of Russian public opinion.

For Ukraine, none of this means Russia is close to defeat. Moscow retains substantial military and industrial resources and continues to conduct attacks against Ukraine. Russia’s ability to continue the war should not be underestimated.

But there is an important distinction between being capable of continuing a war and being able to do so without increasing costs at home.

The weeks around the Duma election have highlighted several pressures simultaneously. Russia is expanding its authorized military personnel strength, defense spending is reaching new records, civilian spending is being squeezed, and taxes and borrowing are increasing all while Independent reporting has documented cases of coercive military recruitment.

For Ukraine and its allies, these developments are relevant to the broader question of how sustainable Russia’s war effort is over time. If Ukraine prevents Russia from achieving a decisive military breakthrough while Russia continues to incur substantial military and economic costs, Moscow will face increasingly difficult decisions about how those costs are distributed across Russian society.

The Duma election gave Putin an even more compliant parliament.

The decisions that followed suggest why he may need one.